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SELECTED OIL AND GAS DECISIONS 
 
Upstream – Federal  
 
5th Circuit  
 
Larry Doiron, Inc. v. Specialty Rental Tools & Supply, L.L.P., 849 F.3d 602 
(5th Cir. 2017). 
 
Contractor and service company (“Company”) executed an oral contract 
(“Contract”) for flow-back services to improve the performance of an 
offshore natural-gas well. Performance on the Contract eventually required 
use of a crane barge. During the flow-back operation, a worker from 
Company suffered injuries after falling from the crane onto the deck of the 
barge. Contractor demanded that Company defend and indemnify 
Contractor against any claims initiated by the worker. The issue became 
whether maritime law or state law governed the indemnity clause of the 
parties’ agreement. Under state law, the indemnity clause was void as 
against public policy; but under maritime law, the clause was enforceable. 
The district court granted summary judgment for Contractor and denied 
Company’s prayer for application of state law. Company appealed, and the 
court of appeals affirmed. First, the court noted that the agreement called 
for application of general maritime law. Then, the court applied a factor test 
to determine whether the work performed was “maritime in nature.” Using 
this test, the court concluded that the flow-back operation was “inextricably 
intertwined with maritime activities,” and thus the district court did not err 
in applying maritime law. 
 
10th Circuit  
 
Max Oil Co. v. Range Prod. Co., No. 16–6238, 2017 WL 972083 (10th Cir. 
Mar. 14, 2017). 
 
Landowner operated various wells on its property and executed a lease 
commitment agreement with Operator. Landowner agreed to install a plug 
on its wells to isolate production zones from the underlying formation. 
Later, a state agency pooled the rights of mineral owners in that formation, 
placed Operator in charge of the pooled unit, and granted Operator a permit 
to drill additional wells. When Operator completed those wells by hydraulic 
fracturing, Landowner noticed its wells producing excess water, which 
restricted production. Landowner unsuccessfully attempted to settle its 
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damages with Operator. After verifying the integrity of its wells, 
Landowner sued Operator for negligence, conversion, and other claims. 
Operator filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the claims were time-barred 
under the relevant limitations period. The district court agreed and 
dismissed the suit with prejudice, concluding any amendment would be 
futile. On appeal, Landowner argued that the limitations period did not 
begin to run until it knew that Operator had caused its damages. But the 
court of appeals concluded that Landowner’s own allegations failed to 
support that argument. In addition, the court stated that Landowner should 
not have feared sanctions because Landowner had reason to believe that 
Operator’s drilling encroached on the wells. Moreover, Landowner’s 
attempts to settle the dispute did not toll or waive the applicable limitations 
period. And finally, the court concluded that the district court did not abuse 
its discretion in refusing leave to amend because Landowner failed to 
present a proper motion. 
 




Potter v. Blue Flame Energy Corp., NO. 2015–CA–000873–MR, 2017 WL 
836942 (Ky. Ct. App. Mar. 3, 2017).  
 
Operator drilled various wells on certain real property to which Landowners 
owned the surface estate. After nearly a decade, Landowners filed a 
complaint against Operator, alleging that Operator was mistaken in 
believing it owned the mineral rights beneath the land. The controversy 
revolved around a century-old deed (“Deed”) from a grantor coal company 
(“Grantor”) to Landowners’ predecessors in interest. The trial court granted 
summary judgment for Operator, concluding the Deed conveyed only the 
surface estate to Landowners because Grantor reserved the entire mineral 
estate. Landowners appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in its 
interpretation. The court of appeals reversed and remanded. The court 
determined that Grantor had reserved only the coal estate in the Deed. 
Absent express severance of the minerals from the surface, the court 
reasoned, the mineral estate remained with the surface owner. In the court’s 
view, Grantor intended to convey the entirety of its interest other than the 
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Smith v. Andrews, No. 51,186-CA, 2017 WL 603992 (La. App. 2 Cir. 
2/15/17).  
 
Mineral servitude owners (“Mineral Owners”) brought an action against 
Landowners claiming they were improperly attempting to divest Mineral 
Owners of their interest. Mineral Owners granted an oil and gas lease on the 
subject tracts, located in the Haynesville shale formation, which eventually 
became producing tracts. Landowners claimed that the last well ceased 
production in 1997, and had the Louisiana regulatory agency issue an order 
of non-production stating that Mineral Owners were aware of non-
production. The boom of the Haynesville shale prompted both parties to 
assert their interest in the mineral estate. The trial court found that Mineral 
Owners met their burden of proving that mineral servitudes did not 
prescribe through nonuse. From 1997 to the time of suit, Mineral Owners, 
through their lessees, made good-faith efforts to produce minerals, and 
production in paying quantities is not necessary to interrupt the prescription 
period under Louisiana law. Therefore, as long as reworking operations 
reasonably relate to restoring production, the operations disrupt the 
prescription period. Unitization of Mineral Owners, with an offset 
production well drilled on their sections, constituted a disruption of the 
prescription period. The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s findings of 
fact that mineral rights remained valid.  
 
Petro-Chem Operating Co. v. Flat River Farms, LLC, No. 51,212-CA, 
2017 WL 786868 (La. App. 2 Cir. 3/1/17).  
 
Operator brought a concursus suit to determine rightful mineral ownership 
between purported Mineral servitude owner (“Mineral Owner”) and Surface 
Owner.  Upon notification of potential title issues, Operator wanted to 
resolve the issue between the two possible owners. Surface Owner argued 
that the mineral servitude was created in a 1994 surface conveyance that 
carved out a mineral reservation to Mineral Owner and that it prescribed to 
Surface Owner the mineral servitude following a ten-year period of nonuse.  
Mineral Owner argued that its interest survived the ten-year period because 
inclement weather and a federal easement obstructed use operations. The 
trial court found that poor planning, not externalities, caused the untimely 
spud date, resulting in the mineral servitude being prescribed to Surface 
Owner. Surface Owner also challenged the correction affidavits filed by the 
notary, changing the ownership rights of the parties from the original 
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filings. The trial court found that the correction affidavits did not properly 
transfer land ownership interests.  The appellate court upheld the trial 
court’s findings and ordered court costs paid from royalty money deposited 




In re Antrim Shale Formation re Operation of Wells Under Vacuum, No. 
327723, 2017 WL 1100717 (Mich. Ct. App. Mar. 21, 2017).  
 
Oil companies (“Companies”) appealed the decision of the state public 
service commission (“Commission”) granting natural gas producers 
(“Producers”) the right and permit to produce natural gas under vacuum. 
Producers argued the process would aid in production from the formation 
and reduce waste. Companies argued that such process would drain the 
field and infringe the correlative rights of other interests. Commission 
found that although Michigan is an “ownership-in-place” jurisdiction, this 
did not apply because the formation production does not draw from a 
common pool; this only limits interests to their respective share of the 
formation. Commission additionally found that the drainage would likely 
not occur due to the complex nature of the fractions in the formation and 
the proper spacing distance under Michigan regulations. The appellate court 
held that Commission’s findings were reasonable and that Commission had 
the proper authority to approve operation of wells under vacuum in the 
Atrium formation.   
 
North Dakota  
 
Burk v. State ex rel. Bd. of Univ. & Sch. Lands, 2017 ND 25, 890 N.W.2d 
535. 
Landowner appealed a judgment in favor of the State based on a claim that 
the State wrongfully withheld gross production and extraction taxes from 
his royalty interests. Landowner purchased land by quit claim deed from a 
Bank that acted as an agent for the state treasurer in 1991. The deed 
reserved fifty percent of the mineral interest to the Bank. Thirteen years 
later, a state school board (“Board”) entered an oil and gas lease with an 
Energy Corporation (“Corp. A”) for 100-percent of the mineral interest. 
Three years later, Landowner entered its own oil and gas lease with a 
different Energy Corporation (“Corp. B”), which prompted a drilling 
company (“Driller”) to complete a well on this property. Driller relied on a 
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2008 title opinion that designated State as 100-percent owner of the mineral 
interest thereby voiding Landowner’s lease with Corp. B. This resulted in 
settlement negotiations and a settlement agreement (“Agreement”) in 2011 
that ended with the State conveying, by quit claim deed, the property 
Landowner initially purchased in 1991, reserving fifty percent of the 
mineral interest. This Agreement also ratified Board’s lease to Corp. A. 
Then in 2012, Landowner sued Driller in federal court to recover taxes 
withheld from his royalties of the gross production, resulting in this appeal. 
But the North Dakota Supreme Court concluded that the plain language of 
the Agreement, though silent, did not provide Landowner a tax-free royalty 
interest. Although the court held the purpose of the 2011 Agreement was to 
place Landowner in the same position as the Bank, it declined to interpret 
the language to give Landowner full authority of the State including 
implying a waiver of taxes from the deed’s language. 
Envtl. Driven Sols., LLC v. Dunn Cty., 2003 ND 140, 890 N.W.2d 841. 
 
Waste disposal company sought a declaratory judgment that the state 
industrial commission (“State”) possessed exclusive regulatory jurisdiction 
over oil treatment plants, rather than the local county (“County”). The trial 
court granted summary judgment, concluding that State had exclusive 
authority to regulate oil treatment plants. County appealed, stating that 
State’s approval violated County property ordinances and that State did not 
have the authority to regulate treatment plants under statutory language. 
The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the trial court order holding that 
the statute unambiguously placed treatment facilities under the exclusive 





Montgomery v. Oil & Gas Enters., Inc., No. 1164 WDA 2015, 2017 WL 
1048113 (Pa. Super. Ct. Mar. 17, 2017).   
 
Landowner sought a declaratory judgment against Lessee to terminate an 
oil and gas lease. Lessee received its interest in the formation through 
partial assignment from another lessee. Landowner received its land interest 
through deed from Lessors after the assignment of the oil and gas lease. The 
trial court granted in favor of Landowner and Lessee appealed claiming that 
the court improperly terminated the lease. The court of appeals first noted 
that the lease and assignment language created severable interests, so 
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Landowner need not have joined all necessary parties, as the suit only 
related to Lessee and Landowner contested interests. The court further 
found that the lease terminated for lack of production, and Lessee’s 
argument regarding potential for production did not overcome the evidence 
of lease termination. The appellate court held that the trial court’s 
conclusion was reasonable and affirmed the termination of Lessee’s interest 
to Landowner’s severed minerals. 
 
Cornwall Mountain Inv., L.P. v. Thomas E. Proctor Heirs Tr., No. 1706 
MDA 2015, 2017 WL 1057496 (Pa. Mar. 21, 2017).  
 
Trustees appealed a judgment for a Developer in a quiet title action as to oil 
and gas rights beneath nearly three thousand acres of unseated property 
acquired from a 1932 tax sale. Although the Pennsylvania Superior Court 
reasoned that this dispute centered on only the sale of the mineral estate at 
the tax sale, and therefore a recent Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision 
would be controlling. Trustees, aiming to invalidate the tax sale, based their 
argument on claims that: (1) “minerals” as used in the 1930 and 1931 
assessments from tax sale did not include the oil and gas interests and (2) 
that state law creates a presumption that “minerals” in a conveying 
instrument does not include “oil or gas.” But after review of other precedent 
invoked by Trustees to support their claim of an applicable state law 
presumption, the court held tax assessment and sales described as “Mineral 
Rights Only” includes oil and gas interests, even if such interests had no 
taxable value at the time of sale because the minerals were undiscovered at 
the time. The court further held that the principle of oil and gas interests as 
not taxable while in the ground does not retroactively apply because of the 
prevailing policy concerns that retroactive invalidation would undermine 




Anadarko Land Corp. v. Family Tree Corp., 2017 WY 24, 389 P.3d 1218. 
 
Corporation-1 brought a quiet title action on a parcel of land that 
Corporation-2 believed it held an interest in. The mineral and surface 
interests had been severed previously with Railroad Company owning the 
mineral rights. In 1912, there was an assessment of tax placed on the 
mineral rights that was never paid, which resulted in a tax deed of those 
interests. Even though there had been a tax deed of the minerals, Railroad 
Company later sold its mineral interest, which ended in the hands of 
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Corporation-2. Corporation-1 acquired what it believed to be ownership of 
both surface and mineral rights in the land. Corporation-2 claims its rights 
in the minerals, stating that the tax deed is void because the taxing authority 
in 1912 had no power to levy the tax. This would void the interest that was 
sold in 1912 and leave Corporation-2 with the rights to the minerals. The 
court held that the tax deed was voidable, not void, and thus a claim that it 
was void had to have been brought by 1918, within the six-year statute of 
limitations. Because a century had since passed from the voidable deed, the 
tax deed stands as a valid conveyance of property, leaving Corporation-1 
with full title to the land. 
 




Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 2017 WL 
908538 (D.D.C. March 7, 2017). 
 
The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (“Corps”) began taking grants for the 
construction of a crude oil pipeline to run near tribal land. The Standing 
Rock Sioux Tribe and the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe (“Sioux Tribes”) 
sought an injunction for the project. Sioux Tribes first sought an injunction 
via a violation of the National Environmental Policy Act. However, the 
court did not find any violation worth preventing the construction of the 
pipeline. Sioux Tribes then sought an injunction based off a violation of the 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”), claiming that the crude oil 
pipeline would prevent the members of the tribes on the reservation to 
practice their religious ceremonies without interference. Under the doctrine 
of laches, Corps tried to bar the RFRA claims. The court heard the RFRA 
claims under scrutiny and ultimately held that the pipeline would not affect 
the practice of Sioux Tribes religious ceremonies enough to justify 
preventing the construction of the pipeline. 
 
S.D. Ohio  
 
Columbia Gas Transmission, LLC v. 171.54 Acres of Land, More or Less, 
in Fairfield, Hocking, Monroe, Morgan, Muskingum, Noble, Perry, and 
Vinton Counties, Ohio, 2017 WL 838214 (S.D. Ohio March 3, 2017). 
 
An interstate natural gas company (“Gas Company”) brought action for an 
order to authorize the condemnation and immediate access and use of all 
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necessary property interests to construct a natural gas pipeline. The Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission has the authority to issue a certificate of 
public convenience and necessity that allows Gas Company to acquire land 
through eminent domain if: (1) the company is unable to agree with 
property owners on compensation or through contract and (2) the use of the 
land is “necessary to comply with the certificate.” The court determined 
that Gas Company met the requirements for the right to condemn the 
necessary properties and then looked to the request for immediate 
possession and use of that land. When weighing the factors of Gas 
Company’s probability of success on the merits of the injunction, the 
irreparable harm to Gas Company absent injunctive relief, and the public 
interest in speedy completion of the project, they outweighed the potential 
harm to the landowners or to the public. Thus, Gas Company gained 
authorization for the use of eminent domain to acquire land necessary to 
build a natural gas pipeline and the immediate access to that land because 
of the large public interest in its completion. 
 




Fleming v. EQT Gathering, LLC, 509 S.W.3d 18 (Ky. 2017). 
 
Landowners allege trespass damages for a 150-foot section of pipeline 
under their land and damages from a bulldozer for a small section of land 
during installation of said pipeline. Pipeline Owner claimed it had authority 
to claim the land through eminent domain and it would be liable at most to 
a reverse condemnation action, not common law trespass. There was a 
dispute over the boundary line of the land in question, with Pipeline Owner 
claiming that the pipeline never crossed onto Landowners’ property. The 
trial court instructed the jury that the pipeline was on Landowners’ land 
though there was evidence to the contrary, including an expert surveyor that 
testified to the pipeline’s complete standing across a county line that 
borders the land in question. The trial court decided in favor of the 
Landowners, assuming that the pipeline did cross the property line and that 
it was subject to common law trespass actions. The Kentucky Supreme 
Court reversed the trial court’s decision in part, holding that the question of 
whether the pipeline crosses onto the landowner’s land is not a question of 
law but a question of fact for the jury to resolve. 
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Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians v. Coachella Valley Water Dist., 
849 F.3d 1262 (9th Cir. 2017). 
On interlocutory appeal from a district court’s grant of partial summary 
judgment in favor of a Native American tribe (“Tribe”) and the United 
States, Water Agencies asked the Ninth Circuit to address whether the 
reserved water rights doctrine from Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 
(1908), applies to groundwater beneath Native American reservations. The 
court answered in the affirmative because: (1) the federal government 
impliedly reserved general water rights when establishing reservations in 
desert regions; (2) Tribe’s implied general reserved water right extended to 
groundwater as it was a condition necessary for Tribe’s survival; and (3) 
any of Tribe’s state water entitlements did not limit its federally implied 
water rights. Thus, when interpreting “short in length” Executive Orders 
that encapsulate a broader governmental objective, such as relocating 
Native American tribes and fostering agrarian societies, courts should infer 
that the government knew of the necessity of water to life for Native 
American tribes in arid environments.  
 
San Luis & Delta-Mendota Water Auth. v. Haugrud, 848 F.3d 1216 (9th 
Cir. 2017).  
 
Water Authority sued the Bureau of Reclamation (“Bureau”) for its failure 
to prepare environmental impact statements or engage in consultation prior 
to its release of water, stating it violated numerous federal statutes. Bureau 
claimed that the statutes cited in Water Authority’s challenge granted it the 
authority to release water, even without environmental impact statements or 
consultation prior to the action. The trial court granted summary judgment 
for Bureau, claiming that it had statutory authority to release the water. The 
trial court additionally found that Water Authority lacked standing to 
challenge the release of the water as it does not pose a “reasonably 
probable” threat to its interests. The trial court stated in passing that the 
federal statute the Bureau relied upon did not authorize release of water to 
benefit a fish population. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the trial 
court ruling except the issue of Bureau’s ability to release water for the 
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benefit of the fish population. The court found that Bureau had the explicit 
statutory authority to release water to benefit the fish population. 
 
D.C. Circuit  
 
Missouri ex rel. Koster v. Zinke, 849 F.3d 1111 (D.C. Cir. 2017).  
 
The Province of Manitoba and the State of Missouri (“Challengers”) 
challenged a project to carry water from the Missouri River to the Hudson 
Bay River Basin, to help supply drinking water for residents, which was 
created by Bureau of Reclamation (“Bureau”) and the State of North 
Dakota (“State”). Challengers alleged that the project failed to meet 
statutory requirements to detail the environmental impact of the proposed 
project. The trial court issued a permanent injunction for the construction of 
the project until Bureau complied with all environmental study 
requirements. State sought modification of the injunction by citing two 
significant changed circumstances: State proposed a plan to reduce its 
influence over the project and detailed the risk of increased arsenic levels in 
the current water supply. The D.C. Circuit granted the State’s modification 






Ware v. Texas Comm’n on Envtl. Quality, No. 03-14-00416, 2017 WL 
875307 (Tex. App. March 3, 2017). 
 
In Texas, water appropriation permits are acquired from the Texas 
Commission on Environmental Quality (“TCEQ”). In 1996, Landowner 
along the Lampasas River obtained a ten-year term permit to allow him to 
divert up to 130 acre-feet of water from the Lampasas River every year. 
Additionally, the permit included a statement that “[t]he priority date of this 
permit and all extensions hereof shall be July 1, 1997.” Eight years later, 
Landowner filed for a renewal of his permit, but TCEQ determined there 
was not enough water in the river to support his usage and denied the 
renewal. Landowner requested a contested-case hearing on the issue and 
argued that his permit should not be denied as Brazos River Authority 
(“BRA”) had a later in time permit and requested much more water than he, 
and therefore its permit should be denied, not his. The Administrative Law 
Judge decided that based on the facts of where the two entities get their 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2017
84 Oil and Gas, Natural Resources, and Energy Journal [Vol. 3 
  
 
water and BRA’s ability to store water, while Landowner had none, 
Landowner’s permit was properly denied. Landowner appealed to the state 
district court and appellate court, both of which upheld the denial of the 
permit as proper under State’s regulatory scheme for water. 
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Porter v. Harden, 891 N.W.2d 420 (Iowa 2017), reh'g denied, 891 N.W.2d 
420 (Mar. 29, 2017).  
Landowners of a six-acre parcel filed forcible entry and detainer (“FED”) 
action against Tenants who lived in a home on Landowner’s parcel for 
twenty-four years. This dispute arose shortly after Tenants filed lawsuit 
against Landowners, claiming they had an oral agreement to purchase the 
property. Tenants replied to the FED action, claiming that they had a farm 
tenancy and that Landowners, in filing their FED action, did not comply 
with the legal requirements for terminating a farm tenancy under a state 
statute. Tenants’ farm tenancy required the court to determine whether 
Tenants’ decision to graze a single, thirty-eight-year-old horse at their 
residence sufficiently established a farm tenancy, to trigger the special 
termination protections. The court referred to another statute that defined 
“farm tenancy” as “a leasehold interest in land held by a person who . . . 
provides for the care and feeding of livestock on the land.” Since the statute 
did not expressly articulate a “primary purpose test” for the phrase “the 
land,” the court applied the doctrine of noscitur a socilis to conclude that 
the keeping of a single horse does not establish a farm tenancy triggering 





Phelan v. Rosener, 511 S.W.3d 431 (Mo. Ct. App. 2017). 
 
Landowner owned land that was once subject to an easement. The easement 
granted Caretaker the right to cross a road to tend to other properties 
adjacent to Landowner’s property. However, Landowner believed the 
easement to be void and thus brought a quiet title action and requested 
trespass damages. The trial court reviewed the easement to determine if it 
was an easement appurtenant or easement in gross. The court found that it 
was an easement appurtenant, even though it was missing “to Owner and 
his heirs” language, as the intent of the easement was for Caretaker to tend 
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to his lands and should remain on the land. Landowner’s second argument 
was merger—that when the easement holder also held the other rights to the 
land that the ownership becomes fee simple and the easement merges into 
the title of the property. However, the trial court dismissed this argument 
stating that Landowner bought the land “subject to all liens and easements 
against it.” Because of this, Caretaker’s easement is still valid. The 
appellate court affirmed the trial court’s decision and reasoning.  
 
North Dakota  
 
Krenz v. XTO Energy, Inc., 2017 ND 19, 890 N.W.2d 222. 
 
Surface Owner had several tracks of land above where energy company 
(“Company”) owned the severed mineral interests. Company had acquired 
easements to run pipes across Surface Owner’s land by purchasing them 
from another oil and gas company. This predecessor company had received 
an easement that granted a right to run one pipeline across the land. It was 
unclear whether this meant one pipeline per tract of land or one pipeline for 
all the tracts of land. When Company began installing a second pipeline, 
Surface Owner sued for trespass, and the trial court granted an $800,000 
damage award. Company appealed on two grounds: (1) that the easement 
was not limited to one pipeline for all the tracts, rather one pipeline per 
track, and (2) that $800,000 was too large an award when Surface Owner 
testified the easement was worth $30,000 to move the case back to state 
court. The appellate court affirmed the lower court’s decision that the 
ambiguous easement agreement should be interpreted to one pipeline for all 
the tracts and that Surface Owner was not estopped from receiving an 
$800,000 award, even though he previously testified that the easement was 




Mount Aldie, LLC v. Land Tr. of Va. Inc., 796 S.E.2d 549 (Va. 2017). 
 
Landowner’s predecessor conveyed to Grantee a conservation easement 
(“Easement”) as to certain forested land. The Easement designated a narrow 
riverside strip as a “riparian buffer.” After acquiring the property, 
Landowner performed tree removal and grading work within the buffer 
area. Grantee then sued, arguing that Landowner’s work within the buffer 
amounted to a breach of the Easement. The trial court agreed and approved 
Grantee’s motion for summary judgment, reasoning that the type of work 
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Landowner performed required notice to and approval from Grantee under 
a certain Easement provision. Landowner appealed, arguing that a different 
provision was controlling. The state supreme court agreed and reversed and 
remanded for further proceedings. The court concluded that Landowner’s 
selective cutting and removing of dead and diseased trees in an existing 
clearing did not amount to a “new opening or clearing” under the Easement 
provision the trial court applied. The court also noted that a different 
provision, one not requiring notice, governed Landowner’s activities within 
the buffer and was not constrained by the provision the trial court applied. 
Finally, the court stated that Grantee did not have exclusive control over the 
riverside trail within the buffer. 
 
Other Land Issues – Federal  
 
Federal Claims  
 
James v. United States, 130 Fed. Cl. 707 (Fed. Cl. 2017).  
 
Landowners along a 12.8 mile stretch of railroad sued the government for 
violating the Fifth Amendment’s just compensation clause when the 
government took their reversionary property interest along the railroad. 
Landowners argued that when the railroad was originally built, Owner 
acquired only a prescriptive easement through eminent domain, not full 
ownership rights. In January 2012, Owner filed a Notice of Exemption that 
it was going to abandon that 12.8 miles of railroad, as no traffic had moved 
over the line within the last two years, and that it would be abandoned by 
January 2013. The January 2013 deadline for abandonment was extended as 
Owner had entered into negotiations with a city and subsequently a non-
profit to turn the land at issue over to them under a Notice of Interim Trail 
Use (“NITU”). The negotiations ended in October 2015, when the non-
profit gave up its interest in the NITU. Landowners claimed that they still 
owned the land at issue and that entering into the NITU with the city 
amounted to taking their property without just compensation. The court 
granted a partial summary judgement in favor of Landowners holding that 
the issuance of the NITU did constitute taking their revisionary interests in 
the land and that compensations should be based on the time that the NITU 
was first granted.  
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4th Circuit  
 
Va. Uranium, Inc. v. Warren, 848 F.3d 590 (4th Cir. 2017). 
 
Following discovery of the largest-known uranium deposit in the United 
States, a state legislature banned conventional uranium mining. Various 
proposals for a permit scheme failed, leaving the moratorium intact. 
Congress thereafter amended the federal Atomic Energy Act (“Act”), which 
regulates nuclear power generation in the United States. Miners then sued 
state officials (“Officials”), arguing that the Act preempted the state’s 
uranium mining ban. The federal district court granted Officials’ motion to 
dismiss, reasoning that Congress did not intend to regulate “nonfederal 
uranium deposits or their conventional mining” through the Act. Miners 
appealed, offering various ways they believed the Act preempted the state 
ban. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court. First, the court 
concluded that conventional uranium mining is not an “activity” regulated 
by the Act. Next, the court noted that the power to regulate mining has 
historically been reserved to the states and nothing in the Act suggests 
Congress aimed to strip the states of that power. Last, the court concluded 
that Congress’s objectives in passing the Act were not materially affected 
by the state’s ban. A lone judge dissented, and the miners have filed a 
petition for writ of certiorari in the Supreme Court of the United States. 
This writ is undecided at the time of publishing. 
 




Boyland v. Castle Farms, Inc., 71 N.E.3d 81 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017).  
 
Farmer sued Neighbor for trespass, and Neighbor cross claimed for trespass 
and adverse possession of the disputed land. Adjacent landowner 
intervened, as its chain of title contained a similar disputed strip of land 
with Farmer. The trial court ruled in favor of Farmer and found that the 
survey received in the initial purchase by Farmer transferred title to it. In 
addition to the initial transfer of the disputed strip of property, the court 
examined the adverse possession standard for Neighbor to have taken title 
to the disputed land. The appellate court explicitly viewed the requirement 
for a would-be adverse possessor to pay all property taxes during the 
adverse possession period. Farmer paid, or had a good faith belief that it 
paid, all taxes associated with the strip from the time of purchase through 
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the present. Property records revealed that Farmer acquired initial title to 
the disputed land, and Neighbor failed to adversely possess the land in 




Hackett v. Murphy Expl. & Prod. Co. USA, No. 16-707, 2017 WL 1002926 
(La. App. 3 Cir. 3/15/17).  
 
Property Owner recently solidified its acquisition of land through an 
ambiguous 1921 deed that conveyed the land, including an area beneath a 
public road. The court determined that Property Owner rightfully owned 
this land under the public road as determined in a separate action. A 
Production Company (“Company”) had previously sold the mineral rights 
of the property that were then determined to be owned by Property Owner. 
Property Owner brought action for payment of proceeds from the sale of 
mineral interests beneath the road. The court determined that Property 
Owner was entitled to damages from the sale of the mineral interests, but 
that the proceeds were limited to the last ten years by liberative 
prescription. Property Owner claimed that Company failed to meet its 
obligation to ascertain ownership of the materials, which precludes the 
running of prescription. Property Owner also claimed that the doctrine of 
contra non valentem (which states that prescription does not run when legal 
action was specifically prevented by defendant) prevented the liberative 
prescription limitation from being used. However, the court determined that 
neither claim was sufficient to overcome the state’s liberative prescription 
and calculated damages by the previous ten years’ proceeds gained from the 




BNSF Ry. Co. v. Chevron Midcontinent, LP, No. 08–16–00119–CV, 2017 
WL 1076540 (Tex. App. Mar. 22, 2017). 
 
Operator struck oil beneath railroad tracks, and railway company 
(“Company”) sued for trespass to try title. Company argued that its 
predecessor’s 1903 deed (“Deed”) gave it the entire strip of land in fee 
simple, rather than merely an easement. The following discrepancy 
undergirded the dispute: The Deed’s granting clause described a “right of 
way” over a “certain strip of land,” but the habendum clause stated the 
grantee owned the strip “in fee simple.” The trial court granted summary 
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judgment for Operator, and Company appealed. The court of appeals first 
noted that “right of way” can mean two different things in a railroad deed: 
(a) a right respecting the land, or (b) the land itself. Thus, it was not 
dispositive that the granting clause used the phrase “right of way,” and the 
clause was ambiguous. The court explored the Deed’s remaining provisions 
for insight as to the grantor’s intent and ultimately sided with Operator. The 
court highlighted the fact that the grantor also deeded the right of “taking 
and using” all wood, water, stone, and timber on the strip. Such language 
“would have almost been absurd” if a fee simple absolute had been 
intended. Thus, the court affirmed the trial court and concluded that the 
habendum’s “fee simple” language contradicted the overall intent of the 
Deed. 
 
Great N. Energy, Inc. v. Circle Ridge Prod., Inc., No. 06-16-00015-CV, 
2017 WL 1089804 (Tex. App. Mar. 22, 2017). 
 
Production Company brought multiple actions against Energy Company. 
Production Company sought to quiet title in a parcel of land that Energy 
Company claimed an interest in. To quiet title in Texas, the court considers 
the strength of the proponent’s title, not the weakness of the adversary’s 
title. Here, Production Company showed that its title came from the trust 
which previously held the land and that Energy Company’s interest came 
from Production Company, not the trust. Because Production Company had 
a strong record of its title, it prevailed in the quite title action. Production 
Company’s argument was strengthened by Energy Company’s claim to 
have received its interest from the same trust as Production Company but it 




Stop the Dump Coal. v. Yamhill Cty., 391 P.3d 932 (Or. Ct. App. 2017). 
 
A landfill petitioned the county to expand that operation in an area then 
designated for use as farmland and would change the floodplain in the area. 
Coalition petitioned to stop the expansion of the landfill, citing a significant 
change in accepted farm practices or increase in cost for the surrounding 
farmland, which is the standard that must be overcome to change the zoning 
from farmland to non-farmland. The main concern to the accepted farm 
practices was the amount of trash on the surrounding farmlands due to litter 
and wind. The court described a significant change in practice or increase in 
cost to be one that will “significantly affect the preservation of productive 
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agricultural land for, among other things, the purpose of obtaining a profit 
in money and providing food.” The suggested litter patrol and cleanup did 
not meet the standard for a significant change in the eyes of the lower court 
or the appeals court. The court also found that to require fencing around the 
landfill is sufficient in mitigating the concerns of trash travelling by wind to 
farmland despite a lack of requirement for height or style of fence. 
Mitigating conditions are also sufficient to reduce for the effect of other 
minor concerns, such as nuisance birds attracted to the landfill coming onto 
the farmland. Ultimately, the court denied Coalition’s petition to stop the 
expansion of the landfill.  
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SELECTED ELECTRICITY DECISIONS 
 




Citizens Action Coal. Of Ind. Inc., S. Ind. Gas and Elec. Co., 70 N.E.3d 429 
(Ind. Ct. App. 2017).  
 
Utility company (“Company”) petitioned state regulatory commission 
(“Commission”) for permission to modify four coal-fired energy plants to 
bring them into compliance with EPA emissions standards. Environmental 
organizations (“Organizations”) challenged the initial and secondary 
approval by Commission of the clean coal technology. Specifically, 
Organizations argued for the record to be reopened and new evidence 
introduced regarding two of the four projects. Organizations argued that 
Company should replace existing coal-fired plants with alternative energy 
sources, such as natural gas, wind, or solar. On a secondary review of the 
proposed project, Commission again approved the implementation of the 
clean coal technology, denying Organizations’ request to reopen the record 
or take new evidence on the matter. Although the expert witnesses of the 
respective sides disagreed regarding future energy production models, the 
court held Commission did not make a clear error in its decision to approve 
the projects based on the totality of the evidence. Nor did the failure to 
reopen the record or review new evidence constitute a clear error, as the 
secondary review was solely to make sure that the projects complied with a 
different state code provision related to energy projects, not to evidence 
gathering mechanisms. Therefore, the appellate court approved the findings 
of the regulatory commission in favor of Company. 
 
Renewable Generation  
 
Federal Claims  
 
Entergy Nuclear Generation Co. v. United States, 130 Fed. Cl. 466 (Fed. 
Cl. 2017).  
 
Two nuclear plant operators (“Prior Operator” and “Current Operator”) 
originally sued the Department of Energy (“DOE”) in 2008 for a partial 
breach of contract pertaining to DOE not disposing of Spent Nuclear Fuel 
(“SNF”). In this original suit, the court awarded Current Operator about $4 
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million in damages. The court dismissed Prior Operator’s claim for lack of 
ripeness as the decommissioning process had not been commenced, which 
would be used as part of the basis of recovery for Prior Operator. In 2015, 
Current Operator again sued DOE for its continued breach of contract in 
failing to dispose SNF from 2009 to 2015. In 2016, Prior Operator also 
again sued DOE, stating that its damages were now ascertainable, as 
Current Operator had begun the decommissioning process by giving a final 
date of operation for the plant. The court ruled that Current Operator had 
standing and denied DOE’s motion to stay discovery. The court also 
dismissed Prior Operator’s suit without prejudice after finding that setting a 
final date for plant operation was insufficient to consider the 
decommissioning process to have commenced.  
 
Sacramento Mun. Util. Dist. v. United States, 130 Fed. Cl. 735 (Fed. Cl. 
2017). 
 
A publicly owned municipal utility district (“District”) entered a contract 
with the Department of Energy (“DOE”) under the Nuclear Waste Policy 
Act (“NWPA”) that required DOE to dispose of spent nuclear fuel (“SNF”) 
and high-level waste (“HLW”) in 1998. In 1998, the Federal Circuit 
determined that the failure to begin disposing of the waste was a partial 
breach of contract. The court determined that the breach, along with other 
related cases, meant DOE owed costs for storage of SNF and labor costs but 
not for the movement from one storage site to another, overhead, internal 
labor, contracts, and legal costs. This action was brought on the same 
contract but for the years between 2010 and 2015 when District had to 
continue paying for cleaning, rental, and operating costs when it would 
have exited the nuclear energy industry by 2009 if DOE had begun disposal 
on schedule. District sued for damages to recover costs from maintaining 
and operating two buildings, site consolidation, water and septic system 
upgrades, backup generator, replacing heating and ventilation, new carpet, 
replacing electrical infrastructure, maintaining an interim storage building, 
refurbishing fuel-handling equipment, and insurance brokerage fees. The 
court found that DOE breached the contract and that the District would be 
entitled to recovery for most of these costs even outside of a breach claim. 
All listed costs were recovered in damages, but DOE was entitled to an 
offset for the sum District received in insurance refunds. The damages 
owed by DOE totaled more than $28 million.  
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Flat Rock Wind, LLC v. Rush Cty. Area Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 70 N.E.3d 
848 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017). 
  
Company wished to install a ninety-turbine wind farm, with over sixty of 
the turbines to be installed in Rush County (“County”). County had a 
zoning restriction that required that all turbines be set back from the 
property lines of nonparticipating land owners by at least 1000 feet. In 
applying to construct the wind farm, Company proposed a setback of 1400 
feet from any nonparticipating property line. The County Area Board of 
Zoning Appeals (“ZBA”), after hearing from County residents that opposed 
the project, ruled that the setbacks had to be 2300 feet from the 
nonparticipating property lines. Company appealed this decision as the 
zoning ordinance stated that the turbines had to be “a minimum of 1000 
feet.” The court held that the ordinance having “minimum” in the zoning 
requirement gave ZBA the authority to extend the requirements, within 
reason, to preserve the health and safety of the public. The trial and 






Citizens v. Graham, 213 So.3d 703 (Fla. 2017). 
  
Office of Public Counsel (“OPC”) sought judicial review of the State Public 
Service Commission’s (“Commission”) decision to grant State Public 
Utilities Company’s (“SPUC”) request to recover certain costs as “fuel 
adjustment costs” associated with constructing a new interconnection with 
another electric utility. SPUC is an investor-owned electric utility that relies 
on power purchase agreements between it and wholesale energy producers. 
In August 2014, SPUC entered a settlement agreement (“Agreement”) with 
OPC for a pending petition requesting an increase in base utility rates. The 
Agreement prohibited SPUC from increasing its base rates until at least 
December 31, 2016. Another section titled “Other Cost Recovery” specified 
which costs SPUC could recover through other mechanisms. One year after 
entering the Agreement, SPUC petitioned Commission to recover costs for 
its fuel adjustments and purchased power from January 2016 through 
December 2016, which contradicted the terms of the 2014 Agreement with 
OPC. SPUC wanted to recover costs associated with construction of a new 
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interconnection with another wholesale provider. Commission’s staff, 
agreeing with OPC and the terms of the Agreement, recommended that 
Commission deny SPUC’s request. Despite these recommendations, 
Commission approved SPUC’s request, addressing and analyzing the 
Agreement’s applicability to a separate issue relating to SPUC’s ability to 
recover costs with the protect. The Florida Supreme Court determined that 
Commission violated state law when it failed to address whether the 
Agreement precluded recovery of such costs. And any costs associated with 
actual construction of the physical transmission structures on the 
interconnection were not recoverable because the “Other Cost Recovery” 
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SELECTED TECHNOLOGY AND BUSINESS DECISIONS 
 




Williams Cos. Inc. v. Energy Transfer Equity, L.P., No. 330, 2016, 2017 
WL 1090912 (Del. Mar. 23, 2017).  
 
Acquiree sought enjoin Acquiror, both in the gas pipeline business, from 
terminating a merger agreement (“Agreement”) between the two parties. 
The Agreement contained two steps and was conditioned upon a tax 
opinion to ensure neither step represented a taxable event for either party. 
The chancery court found that Acquiror’s only duty was to not obstruct the 
performance of the Agreement. In addition, the chancery court found that 
Acquiror did not unreasonably omit or fail to diligently obtain the tax 
opinion on which the parties conditioned the Agreement. Additionally, the 
chancery court found that the law firm tasked to issue the opinion made a 
good faith determination to not issue the tax opinion.  The appellate court 
affirmed the lower opinion with one caveat. The Delaware Supreme Court 
held that the chancery court adopted too narrow of a view regarding the 
Acquiror’s obligations imposed by the Agreement, and if Acquiror 
breached those implied covenants of the Agreement, Acquiror bears the 
burden to show these breaches did not cause the failure to close. However, 
the court found that even under this higher standard, Acquiror met its 
burden to show that its breaches did not materially cause the failure of the 
Agreement closure.  
 




Cameron Parish Police Jury v. All Taxpayers, 2017-55 (La. App. 3 Cir. 
2/21/17); 212 So.3d 663.  
 
The Parish Police Jury (“Police Jury”) and the Parish School Board 
(“School Board”) executed a Cooperative Endeavor Agreement and 
Payment in lieu of Taxes Agreement (collectively “Agreements”) with gas 
company (“Company”). Agreements allowed Company to pay as their 
property taxes a fixed dollar amount to the Parish rather than pay a 
percentage of the land value. The Parish assessor sued, claiming that 
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Company was required to pay a percentage of its land value in taxes and 
that the Agreements were invalid and unconstitutional. Police Jury and 
School Board claimed that state law permitted these Agreements, rendering 
their Agreements with Company valid. Aside from execution issues with 
the Agreements themselves, the court ruled in favor of the Parish assessor 
by finding that, under the state constitution, the statutes could not apply to 
for-profit enterprises like Company, but only to enterprises owned by non-
profit organizations. The Agreements with Company were struck, requiring 




Valero Refining-Texas, L.P. v. Galveston Cent. Appraisal Dist., No. 15-
0492, 2017 WL 727276 (Tex. Feb. 24, 2017). 
 
State law provides that “‘[t]axation shall be equal and uniform’” and that 
“‘a property is appraised unequally if [its] appraised value . . . exceeds the 
median appraised value of a reasonable number of comparable properties 
appropriately adjusted.’” In evaluating taxes in the state, large and complex 
properties can be broken down into separate accounts containing different 
pieces of the property within the accounts, as long as each has its own tax 
account number and District gives the owner notice of what property is a 
part of each tax account. According to Refinery, District improperly 
assessed Refinery’s taxes in two ways. First, it argued that its property as a 
refinery should be assessed in comparison to two other refineries in the 
county, as they are similar properties, and should not be assessed 
independently from the others because of their size. Second, it argued that 
District not only improperly assessed the value of the pollution control 
equipment (“PCE”), but that it was also its own separate account and 
therefore its value should be excluded from the accounts at issue. The jury 
found for Refinery and the district court awarded it attorney fees and a 
refund of almost $5 million. The appellate court reversed, stating that there 
was no evidence to support the jury verdict based on the exclusion of PCE, 
and remanded to district court for a new trial on the unequal appraisal. The 
parties appealed to the Texas Supreme Court, which found that there were 
enough facts to show Refinery was similar to the other two refineries and 
therefore should be compared to them and that because PCE can be 
appraised separately, it should not be included in the appraisal of other 
accounts. The court reversed and remanded the case to resolve factual 
issues and held that if Refinery prevails it is entitled to attorney fees. 
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1st Circuit  
 
Berkshire Envtl. Action Team, Inc. v. Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co., 851 F.3d 105 
(1st Cir. 2017). 
 
According to the Natural Gas Act (“NGA”), companies looking to build a 
natural gas pipeline must first get approval from Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission (“FERC”). Under the Clean Water Act (“CWA”) if discharge 
may occur in navigable waters, companies must also receive “a certificate 
from the State in which the discharge originates or will originate.” In July 
2014, Company petitioned FERC for permission to build a natural gas 
pipeline. FERC granted the petition in March 2016, subject to several 
conditions, including that Company obtain State approval. Previously, in 
June 2015, Company applied for a certificate with the correct state agency 
(“Agency”) and received a conditional certificate in June 2016. Company 
could not begin any work under the certificate until the Appeal Period 
expired. Environmental Group filed notice of hearing within the Appeal 
Period, which Company sought to stay, arguing that because Agency had 
given Company a conditional certification, State involvement had ended 
and any review of Agency’s decision must take place in court. Agency 
denied Company’s request to stay further proceedings and scheduled a final 
hearing date. Company sued, seeking to bar further review by the Agency, 
while Environmental Group sued to preserve review of the conditional 
certificate and argued Company’s view was wrong such that any review 
before Agency completed its adjudicatory process was premature. The court 
agreed with Environmental Group that it should restrict its review of 
agency action to final agency action, and therefore dismissed the case for 
lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 
 
4th Circuit  
 
Blankenship v. Consolidation Coal Co., 850 F.3d 630 (4th Cir. 2017). 
 
Company owns a mine that needed “dewatering” and so it sought to pump 
its excess water into another mine that had been exhausted already. 
Company applied for the proper revisions in its mining permit for the state, 
gave formal notice to the Mine Safety and Health Administration 
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(“MSHA”), and published notice of its application for such permit in the 
local newspapers and courthouses. The state agency approved the 
application and Company dewatered its mine into the exhausted mine from 
1994 – 2003. One set of Landowners, who’s property was partially over the 
exhausted mine, filed suit against Company in 2011 in state court, and then 
withdrew its suit and refiled in federal court in 2013. Another set of 
Landowners in the same property position filed their first suit in state court 
in 2013, and withdrew and refiled in federal court in 2014. Both sets of 
claims were based on state law claims such as trespass and nuisance. The 
district court granted Company’s motion for summary judgment for both 
claims citing that the state’s statute of limitations, which begins when the 
injury has occurred, had run on such claims, and that the Comprehensive 
Environmental Resources, Compensation and Liability Act’s (“CERCLA”) 
discovery rule of tolling state statute of limitations until plaintiffs know or 
reasonably should know of such injury did not toll the statute of limitations 
because there was no claim arising under CERCLA. The appellate court 
affirmed, stating that no harms formed a basis for a CERCLA claim, and 
therefore, its discovery rule that would have tolled the statute of limitations 
did not apply, so Landowners’ claim was barred as it fell outside the 




Abbot v. BP Expl. & Prod., Inc., 851 F.3d 384 (5th Cir. 2017). 
 
Former employee (“Employee”) and environmental organization 
(“Organization”) sued an oil company (“Company”) under federal law for 
alleged false compliance with regulatory schemes for an offshore 
production operation. The trial court granted Company’s motion for 
summary judgment. On appeal, the court reviewed the requirements of the 
applicable federal statutes and whether or not a genuine issue of material 
fact existed as to the requirements. The federal government vigorously 
investigated the Employee’s and Organization’s claims and found no 
violation of compliance requirements. Additionally, Employee and 
Organization failed to plead an individualized injury as the result of the 
claimed failure of compliance. The appellate court, therefore, affirmed the 
trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Company. 
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9th Circuit  
 
Hopi Tribe v. EPA, 851 F.3d 957 (9th Cir. 2017). 
 
EPA underwent the rule making process to change the standards of coal 
energy generating facilities, one of which was owned by Tribe. Because the 
new rule will eventually lead to a shutdown of Tribe’s facility, Tribe sued 
EPA because it failed to include Tribe in the Technical Working Group 
negotiations (“TWG”), which is one step of many required for EPA to pass 
a new rule. Tribe was invited to all other rule making meetings by EPA, but 
because it was not invited to TWG, Tribe stated that EPA violated its 
“trust” responsibilities to Tribe. The court ruled without analyzing the 
potential trust violation, as it was the Department of the Interior (“DOI”) 
who ran the TWG negotiations and thus it would have been DOI’s 
responsibility to invite Tribe to TWG. Because Tribe failed to sue the DOI, 
the new EPA rule stands.  
 
Yazzie v. EPA, 851 F.3d. 960 (9th Cir. 2017). 
 
Several Native American tribes (“Tribes”) and non-profit environmental 
organizations (“Organizations”) sought review of EPA source-specific 
Federal Implementation Plan (“FIP”) under the Clean Air Act (“CAA”) for 
the largest coal-fired power plant (“Plant”) in the western United States, 
which happens to be on a reservation. The Plant emits gases that cloud 
visibility (including in the Grand Canyon) but also provides significant 
revenue and jobs for one of the Tribes while helping distribute more than 
20% of the state’s water. Because Tribes did not issue a Tribal 
Implementation Plan (“TIP”) for the Plant, EPA issued its FIP, including an 
option for the best available retrofit technology (“BART”), which is 
required of states determining available reduction of haze from a source 
unless they have a “better than BART” alternative. Organizations petitioned 
for a new plan, claiming that the five-year window to implement the BART 
had passed. Here, the FIP implemented a better than BART alternative, 
which the court determined did not have the same time limits for 
implementation, and denied that part of the petition. The petition also 
claimed that the “better than BART” alternative was favored in giving too 
many emission credits in the calculation. However, the court found that the 
alternative would reasonably have more emission credits because of its 
quicker installation. The court denied this section of the petition also 
because EPA acted arbitrarily and capriciously in its FIP under these 
circumstances. 
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Protect Our Cmty. Found. v. Black, 2017 WL 882278 (S.D. Cal. March 6, 
2017). 
 
Environmental group (“Group”) sued the Bureau of Indian Affairs (“BIA”) 
for not conducting an adequate environmental impact statement (“EIS”) 
before approving the installation of wind turbines in an area inhabited by 
endangered eagles. The director of BIA used an EIS that had been prepared 
previously without making any alterations. This EIS was used to approve 
the installation of the turbines. Under the Administrative Procedure Act, the 
BIA is allowed to use EIS produced by other agencies. Group sought an 
injunction on the project, demanding that the BIA produce its own EIS, or 
at the minimum, produce a statement that included data post-2011, when 
the EIS was conducted. The court ruled in favor of BIA, stating that the EIS 




Martinez v. Colo. Oil & Gas Conservation Comm'n, No. 2017 COA 37. 
 
State residents petitioned a state oil and gas conservation commission 
(“Commission”) to propose a rule that would require Commission to 
consider the “best available science” and receive confirmation by a third-
party organization before issuing any drilling permits in the state. The 
residents sought to ensure that future drilling operations did not negatively 
impact the State’s environment or the well-being of its residents. After 
soliciting comments on the proposed rule, Commission denied the petition 
because the proposed rule was beyond its scope of authority and contrary to 
the state’s Oil and Gas Conservation Act (“Act”) from which Commission 
received its authority to regulate oil and gas production in the interests of 
public health and safety. The residents appealed to a state appellate court. 
And the dispute turned on the interpretation of “in a manner consistent 
with” under a provision of the Act. The appellate court concluded that both 
Commission and the lower court misinterpreted the plain meaning of “in a 
manner consistent with” by concluding that the Commission must 
“balance” the interests supporting oil and gas development “in a manner 
consistent with” the protection of public health and welfare when 
promulgating new rules under the Act. Rather than implying a balancing 
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test, the appellate court interpreted the plain meaning of “in a manner 
consistent with” to indicate a “condition” that the Commission must fulfill 
based on similar interpretations of such language from the state supreme 
court and the commonly understood use of the phrase in state statutes. 
Thus, the plain meaning of “in a manner consistent with” means that 
Commission must complete development that is subject to the protection of 
public health and welfare of its residents. The appellate court remanded the 




Sweet Lake Land & Oil Co. v. Oleum Operating Co., No. 16-429, 2017 WL 
914767 (La. App. 3 Cir. Mar. 8, 2017).  
 
Lessor sued Lessee, Lessee’s predecessor-in-interest (“Predecessor”), and 
Lessee’s successor-in-interest (“Successor”) for failure to comply with 
oilfield cleanup provisions and remediating under the leases. A jury found 
Lessee responsible for oil field cleanup on Lessor’s property and concluded 
that Predecessor and Successor bear no responsibility under the lease 
provisions. Lessor appealed regarding the obligations of Predecessor and 
Successor and the dollar amount required in remediating the property. The 
lease language clearly established the obligation of Predecessor and 
Successor to conduct cleanup efforts on the property. The appellate court 
remanded the case to establish the dollar figure required to remediate the 





Swallow Tail, LLC v. Mo. Dep’t of Conservation, WD 79560, 2017 WL 
892549 (Mo. Ct. App. March 7, 2017).  
 
Company sued the state department of conservation (“Department”) and a 
non-profit conservation foundation (“Foundation”) for improper use of 
public funds for private benefit in the “design, support, and operation of a 
compensatory mitigation program.” The state constitution prohibits the 
state government (including Department) from using public funds to the 
benefit of private entities. Company claimed that Department gave 
Foundation a higher amount of mitigation credits upon completion of 
Department’s conservation projects. Foundation is designed specifically to 
provide grants to Department’s projects that are deemed high priority to 
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ensure timely completion. The court determined that use of Department 
funds for the public purpose of environmental conservation determines that 
any private benefit to Foundation providing grants for that same purpose is 




Friends of Great Salt Lake v. Utah Dep’t of Nat. Res., 2017 UT 15, 393 
P.3d 291.  
 
The Utah Department of Natural Resources (“UDNR”) granted a minerals 
corporation (“Mineral Corp”) a lease to mine on sovereign state lands. An 
environmental group (“Group”) sued to prevent Mineral Corp from mining 
on the land it had obtained in the lease. Group brought numerous claims, 
attempting to prevent the mining. Group requested an agency action and 
declaratory order which would have removed Mineral Corp’s lease to mine 
completely. However, the court held Group did not have standing or a legal 
basis to receive this relief. Group also sued on the grounds that Mineral 
Corp did not complete site-specific planning on its mining operations. The 
court held that Group had limited standing to demand site-specific planning 
on the mining operations. Thus, the court, while denying Group’s requests 
for extraordinary relief, held that Mineral Corp must produce site-specific 





Forest Lakes Cmty. Ass’n, Inc. v. United Land Corp. of Am., 795 S.E.2d 
875 (Va. 2017). 
 
Two property owners’ associations (“POAs”) sued the owners and 
developers of a commercial shopping center (“Shopping Center”) claiming 
that its sediment basins were discharging sediment into a creek that flowed 
into a lake owned by the POAs. Construction of the shopping center began 
in 2003, and the sediment basins used in the construction were complete by 
2004, complying with both local and state regulations. The POAs 
complained to the County about the sediment basin discharge, but the 
County ultimately rejected the suggestion for more robust controls. The 
POAs discussed the need for legal action in 2004 and 2005 but did not file 
such action until 2011. The appellate court dismissed the action stating it 
was barred by the statute of limitations which began to toll with the 
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beginning of construction of the sediment basins causing discharge, which 
occurred in 2004. The Virginia Supreme Court upheld the appellate court’s 
decision, citing that state law on recurring injury from permanent structures 
had long held that the statute of limitations began to run when the injury 
was first sustained, even if the injury is continuous and regular. 
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